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THE LEGAL BASIS OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN NIGERIA
DR. R. CHUDE OKONKWOR*
This article's purpose is to examine the legal framework within
which freedom of expression is practiced in Nigeria. Because con-
cepts such as freedom of expression are subject to various philo-
sophical interpretations, one needs to succinctly delineate the scope
of any discussion surrounding such concepts. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to point out some basic assumptions before embarking on the
substantive discussion of freedom of expression in Nigeria.
The first assumption arises out of the fact that the military gov-
ernment presently in power in Nigeria' is regarded as transient.
This is so because the mere existence of that type of government
constitutes a state of emergency which negates any constitutional or
legal tenets in the country.2 As a corrollary to this state of affairs, it
is assumed that Nigeria believes in a democratic form of govern-
ment. The second assumption occurs because Nigeria has consist-
ently included provisions guaranteeing freedom of expression in
her constitutions since the constitution of 1958, up to and including
the draft of 1976.' Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Nigeria
believes in preserving this fundamental right.
The last assumption concerns the legitimacy and supremacy of
the constitution. Recently, Nigerians have been engaged in the con-
stitution making process. The Constitutional Drafting Committee
4
drafted a new set of constitutional proposals, and the media pro-
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1. The civilian government of Nigeria was overthrown in a coup d'etat by 25 Army
officers on January 15, 1966.2 ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMIT-TEE, CONSTI-
TUTIONS OF AFRICAN STATES 1150 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 2 AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS].
2. See The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1966: Decree No. I
(Jan. 17, 1966), reprinted in 2 AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1274 [hereinafter
cited as Decree No. 11.
3. The draft constitution has yet to be adopted.
4. The Constitutional Drafting Committee is often referred to as the "forty-nine
wisemen."
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vided information regarding these proposals to Nigerians who, be-
cause of this process, were given a chance to identify with the
constitution. The proposals, in effect, were put through a process of
popularization. A specially elected constituent assembly will meet
in Lagos to ratify and/or amend these proposals; when this occurs,
Nigeria will be deviating sharply from the conventional methods
employed by former colonies when adopting a constitution. She
will, in fact, be conforming to stipulations espoused by Professor
Nwabueze for determining the legitimacy of a constitution. These
include the formulation by the people, or their representatives, of a
document which has the force of supreme law, and which creates
and defines the organs of government, and assigns specific powers
to the government which limit their legal operations.5 Therefore,
the final assumption is that the constitution is the highest legal doc-
ument to which Nigerians look for guidance when questions con-
cerning fundamental rights are raised. The 1963 Nigerian
Republican Constitution, whose essential provisions are still in
force despite the military presence,6 declares that:
[Tihis Constitution shall have the force of law throughout Nige-
ria and. . . if any other law (including the constitution of a Re-
gion) is inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution
shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsis-
tency, be void.7
The constitution also provides for the alteration of any of the provi-
sions by Parliament that are supported by a resolution and passed
by a vote of not less than two-thirds of all the members, and by
each legislative house of at least three out of the four regions in the
country.
Fortunately, the draft constitution retains, as its section one,
chapter one, the provision regarding the supremacy of the constitu-
tion and states that "its provisions shall have binding force on all
persons and authorities throughout the Federal Republic of Nige-
ria."9 Such provisions provide evidence that Nigeria is aware that a
constitution needs enough power to enable it to limit the arbitrari-
ness and high handedness that is inherent in all governments. Dec-
5. B. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 25-26 (1973).
6. Decree No. 1, supra note 2.
7. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ch. 1, § 1, reprinted in 2
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1156. The official language in Nigeria is English.
8. Id. § 4(1) & (2).
9. 1 Constitution Drafting Committee, Report of the Constitution Drafting Commit-
tee Containing the Draft Constitution 9 (1976).
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larations of good intentions usually are not enough when one
considers those who gain from limitations on governmental powers.
If the modern concept of democracy continues to mean government
of the people, by the people, and for the people, constitutions must
limit governments by constitutionally guaranteeing individual civil
liberties which are enforceable by an independent judiciary. In ad-
dition to civil liberties guarantees, Professor Mclwain maintains
that "full responsibility of government to the whole mass of the
governed"' ° is imperative.
Many governments, particularly those of the developing coun-
tries, frown upon restraints that favor the individual. For this rea-
son, there is often a substantial gap between constitutional
guarantees and their actual practice. Holding the government ac-
countable to the people presupposes that individuals are always
free to question and criticize governmental actions. From that sup-
position, the duty of the government to explain and justify its con-
duct follows. Finally, sanctions must be available to remedy
unconstitutional governmental conduct. In an ideal situation, then,
freedom of expression is of vital importance to the smooth working
of a democratic society. This is so because such freedom bears on
politics and matters of public interest. By this same reasoning, it
becomes apparent that the right of the individual to criticize the
government carries great potential of bringing the interests of the
individual into conflict with those government functionaries whose
conduct he criticizes. This result becomes even more apparent if
one bears in mind the resentment of the governing elite within de-
veloping countries. It should be noted, however, that those in gov-
ernment have equal rights to be protected from unwarranted and
scurrilous attacks from individuals and the mass media.
Having accepted the constitution as the legal foundation re-
garding fundamental rights, and bearing in mind that the problems
surrounding freedom of expression essentially can be reduced to
reconciling the individual's legitimate interests with those of public
officials, this article will examine the extent to which the Nigerian
Constitution has set up guidelines for the enjoyment of the right of
freedom of expression. This shall be accomplished by first discuss-
ing the constitution's historical background, followed by a discus-
sion of specific constitutional guarantees and certain constraints
that have been placed upon freedom of expression.
10. C. MCILLWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 141-146 (1947).
Vol. 8
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The provisions regarding fundamental rights in the Nigerian
Constitution are based on the report of the Minorities Commission
which was set up by the British government in 1957 "to ascertain
the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to
propose means of allaying those fears whether well or ill-
founded." " Prior to independence, the heterogeneous nature of the
peoples and regions of Nigeria, and the federal system which the
British attempted to introduce, engendered in the minds of minor-
ity ethnic groups the fear of being perpetually deprived and domi-
nated by the three major ethnic groups of Igbo, Yoruba, and
Hausa. Following recommendations by the Commission that con-
stitutional safeguards for minorities be written into the 1958 consti-
tution, a Nigerian "Bill of Rights" surfaced for the first time in the
constitution,' 2 which included a guarantee of rights and centraliza-
tion of the federal police. This Bill of Rights served not only to
secure the unity of the country, but also acted as a buffer against
any abuse of power by majorities.
The Commission's recommendations, however, did not solve
the minorities' problems in Nigeria.' 3 One of the major causes of
the 1967 Civil War can be traced to the primordial antagonisms
that existed among the various ethnic groups in the country. In
spite of the rights enshrined in the 1958 constitution, the govern-
ment did not hesitate to encroach upon individual freedoms, and
particularly upon freedom of expression. Nwabueze states that "the
law of sedition. . . had to be made harsher and be more rigorously
enforced than in Britain in order to guard against the possibility
that the relatively small politically articulate section of the popula-
tion might exploit the natural resentment against colonialism to in-
cite the populace to disaffection."' 4
The Minorities Commission anticipated the vulnerability of
the individual rights provisions in the constitution, but, neverthe-
less, reported:
11. Minorities Commission, Command Paper No. 8934, at 13 (1957) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Commission]. The Commission was headed by Sir Henry Willinck and is
sometimes referred to as the Willinck's Commission.
12. 2 AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1149. The so called "Bill of Rights"
was contained in ch. 3, §§ 17-32.
13. A civil war over the secession of Biafra broke out on July 7, 1967 and lasted until
January of 1970. Id. at 1150.
14. NWABUEZE, supra note 5, at 40.
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Provisions of this kind in the constitution are difficult to en-
force and sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, we think
they should be inserted. Their presence defines beliefs wide-
spread among democratic countries and provides a standard to
which appeal may be made by those whose rights are in-
fringed. 15
Realizing that constitutional safeguards, alone, do not provide
complete and unchallengeable security, the Commission warned
that "a government determined to abandon democratic courses will
find ways of avoiding them."' 6 Yet, the Commission hoped that the
constitutional safeguards would prevent a steady deterioration in
standards of freedom and the government's ability to unobstru-
sively encroach upon individual rights. Essentially the Commission
thought that such safeguards would constitute the outer bulwarks
of defense against the might of governmental power.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
Among the democratic countries of the West, and in those de-
veloping countries within Africa, Asia, and Latin America who are
striving towards democracy, the traditional focal point for discuss-
ing specific constitutional provisions regarding freedom of expres-
sion has been the first amendment to the United States
Constitution. The guarantee is stated as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a re-
dress of grievances.'
7
This seemingly all-encompassing constitutional guarantee did not
apply to the state governments within the United States for fifty-
seven years. Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
dicta, made freedom of speech as safe from state governments,
under the fourteenth amendment, as well as from the federal gov-
ernment when it stated that:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fun-
damental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due pro-
15. Minorities Commission, Command Paper No. 505, at 97 (1958).
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Vol. 8
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cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the States. 18
The first and fourteenth amendments both provide protection for
freedom of expression and have experienced numerous interpreta-
tions. Almost two centuries after the adoption of the first amend-
ment, the full scope of protection afforded the press is still evolving
through both state and federal court decisions. The United States
Supreme Court has delineated the boundaries of constitutional pro-
tection regarding such matters as critical expression,' 9 and has
ruled on the question of the time, place, and manner of expres-
sion.20 Moreover, the Court has dealt with such issues as personal
attacks through the broadcast media,21 personal privacy, 22 and pe-
titioning the government for a redress of grievances. 23 The point to
be gleaned from this discussion is that, even in the United States,
the first and fourteenth amendment protections are not absolute,
for the Supreme Court has been called upon continuously to define
limits and parameters surrounding the guarantees.
The relevant constitutional provisions governing freedom of
speech in the Nigerian Constitution are as follows:
1. Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, in-
cluding freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
ideas and information without interference.
2. Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is rea-
sonably justifiable in a democratic society.
a. - in the interest of defense, public safety, public order,
public morality or public health;
b. - for the purpose of protecting rights, reputation and free-
dom of other persons, preventing the disclosure of infor-
mation received in confidence, maintaining the authority
and independence of the Courts or regulating telephony,
wireless broadcasting, television, or the exhibition of
cinematograph film;
c. - for imposing restriction upon persons holding office
under the state, members of the armed forces of the Fed-
18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
19. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949).
21. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
22. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965).
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1978], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss2/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
eration or members of the police force. 24
In Nigeria, individual rights are divided into two groups. The
first group includes rights that are relatively absolute. These rights
cannot be limited by Parliament or any legislative body except in
time of war or national emergency, and include the rights to life, to
protection against inhuman treatment, to protection against slavery
or servitude, to personal liberty, and to the fair judicial determina-
tion of civil and criminal rights.25 The second group consists of
those rights that are regarded as "qualified." Such rights may be
limited by any law that is "reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society"26 if the law's purpose is permitted by the constitution. The
right to private life, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement are examples of
these "qualified" rights.27 Thus, a delicate balancing between indi-
vidual interests and societal interests becomes necessary with this
group of rights.
More important than the range of the rights guaranteed is the
way in which the provisions are formulated, because the scope and
sweep of the provisos attached to the guarantees are heavily influ-
ential when determining the effectiveness of the guarantees. In Ni-
geria, the question of effectiveness is inextricably connected with
the formulation of the guarantees in the constitution. The "quali-
fied" rights are subject to certain exceptions, and have provisos at-
tached that state that the guarantee is not to invalidate any law that
is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interest of
defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public
health.2" Unquestionably, a guarantee needs to be balanced against
society's demands, but the question remains as to whether the for-
mulation of the exceptions strikes a proper balance, or whether
there is a tilt in favor of one over the other.
Consider the power given to the legislature to enact laws
abridging the freedom of expression, and examine the implications
of the words "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society" and
"nothing in this section shall invalidate any law. . . ." Such words
are manifestly vague and flexible, and raise vital questions. For ex-
ample, how is the degree of freedom compatible with democracy to
24. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ch. 3, § 25(l),(2)(a)-(b)-(c),
reprinted in 2 AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1156.
25. See id. ch. 3, §§ 18-22.
26. Id. §§ 23-27.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., id. § 25(a).
Vol. 8
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be determined? There is no agreed lowest common denominator of
democratic behavior applicable to all societies, yet, such a common
yardstick is imperative if we are to ascertain whether "reasonably
justifiable" does not leave too much scope for the subjective manip-
ulations of legislators and administrators. One Nigerian court at-
tempted to define "reasonably justifiable." Justice Bates ruled that
in order to be reasonably justifiable "a restriction upon a funda-
mental human right must be necessary . . . [and must] not be ex-
cessive or out of proportion to the object which it is sought to
achieve."29 Considering the Justice's definition, it seems that the
Nigerian courts can benefit from the United States concept of due
process. This concept has enabled the United States Supreme Court
to strike down any law that has unreasonably or arbitrarily inter-
fered with liberty. One such case is Cox v. Louisiana in which the
State of Louisiana convicted Reverend B. Elton Cox, leader of a
civil rights demonstration, for disturbing the peace and obstructing
public passages. In reversing the judgment, the United States
Supreme Court held that Louisiana could not constitutionally pun-
ish appellant under its "disturbing the peace" statute, and that the
statute as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court is unconsti-
tutionally vague.30
Another objection to the framing of the Nigerian Bill of Rights
concerns the words: "Nothing in this section shall invalidate any
law . .. .I I These words seem to be tilted in favor of the deroga-
tory law, which thereby shifts the onus to the challenging person to
prove that the law is not reasonably justifiable. This is akin to the
United States Supreme Court's doctrine of judicial review of stat-
utes whereby acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitu-
tional, even if infringing upon first amendment freedoms, unless
arbitrary or unreasonable.32 It is submitted that the onus of proving
the reasonable justifiability of a law should be on the authorities,
thereby enhancing the value of the guaranteed right. When consid-
ering the question of the presumption of constitutionality, it should
be remembered that fundamental rights in Nigeria were designed
by the federal government to allay the fears of minorities. It is,
therefore, necessary to deviate from the normal and typical ap-
29. Cheranci v. Cheranci, N.R.N.L.R. 24, 29 (1960). The citation N.R.N.L.R. refers to
the Northern Region of Nigerian Law Reports.
30. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965).
31. These words are found in sections 23-28.
32. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1925), citing Great Northern Ry. v.
Clara City, 246 U.S. 434, 439 (1918).
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proaches employed by judges in England, where the judgment of
Parliament regarding the necessity for any legislation cannot be
properly questioned by the courts. The Nigerian courts should al-
ways bear in mind that the primary purpose of guaranteeing indi-
vidual rights is to protect the minority from the tyranny and
arbitrariness of the majority, which here is represented by the gov-
ernment.
We come now to the question of interpreting and enforcing the
Nigerian Bill of Rights. Original jurisdiction to enforce the funda-
mental rights is vested in the high courts of the states, from whence
appeals can be taken to the Federal Supreme Court. There is a con-
stitutional provision which states that "any person who alleges that
any of the fundamental rights provisions have been contravened in
relation to him may apply to the High Court. .... ,33 The Nigerian
courts will find no guidance from the constitution regarding the
form to take when enforcing fundamental rights, other than refer-
ence to writs, orders, and direction. The court, therefore, may issue
prerogative orders, mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, or, in ap-
propriate cases, it may employ normal remedies, such as the trans-
fer of judicial proceedings and ordering retrials. When interpreting
constitutional provisions, much depends upon the judicial orienta-
tion adopted by the Federal Supreme Court. Nigeria, like most
Commonwealth countries, operates under the common law. In
common law jurisdictions, the choice lies between strict adherence
to the ordinary rules of statutory construction, or judicial restraint
and judicial activism, which espouses a more beneficial interpreta-
tion of the constitution than the normal rules of statutory construc-
tion allow.
The Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria is the final court for
deciding constitutional issues, and is also the final domestic appeal-
late court. Therefore, the principle of judicial restraint might be ex-
pected. However, some provisions in the Bill of Rights are so
worded that the supreme court will find it difficult to avoid the as-
sumption of a policy-making role on important public questions.
Take, for example, the issue of evidence. How will evidence of what
is "reasonable and justifiable" in a "democratic society" be ad-
duced, and who will adduce such evidence-the government or the
aggrieved party? Will the practice in other countries alleged to have
democratic forms of government have to be taken into account? If
33. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ch. 3, § 32(l), reprinted in 2
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, at 1156.
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so, will evidence on the question of whether such countries are truly
democratic have to be introduced? What is true democracy? These
are some of the fascinating questions with which the supreme court
will have to grapple.
The Nigerian Bill of Rights differs essentially from the rest of
the constitution because it is a statement of principles that involves
the application of nonlegal criteria. When interpreting the provi-
sions, the courts will have to consider the reasonableness and
justifiability of legislative and executive acts. This compels a
subjective, rather than a purely objective, approach that adheres to
strict statutory construction. The subjective approach involves the
measurement of reasonableness and justifiability in terms of the
historical setting; the local, political, and social conditions; and lo-
cal standards of acceptability. The task of developing a jurispru-
dence relating to the constitution must be discharged primarily by
the supreme court. This should have the effect of keeping the char-
ter of government current and in tune with the needs of the day. A
liberal and effective interpretation of the freedom of expression
provisions is highly desirable, and should not be unduly confined
by restrictive technicalities and interpretation. Otherwise, the clear
danger exists that the enforcement procedure will cease to be a spe-
cial remedy. An action brought to protect freedom of expression
would become just another kind of litigation, with the inherent po-
tentialities of procrastination and evasion of issues by the pursuit of
technical points. If this happens, the rights will fall into disregard.
III. CONSTRAINTS UPON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Colonialism is intrinsically inimical to the fostering of democ-
racy. This inherent conflict can be felt even more strongly in the
field of freedom of expression where a different viewpoint invaria-
bly is regarded as a ploy to unseat an imperial power. Colonial
administrators thought that a press of any type was dangerous in
the hands of "barbaric" Africans, and, therefore, a critical national-
ist press was doubly dangerous. Lord Lugard, one of the early Brit-
ish administrators in Nigeria, deprecatingly regarded the Nigerian
journalists as "mission-educated young men who live in villages,
interferring with the native councils, and acting as correspondents
for the mendacious native press." He stated that the Nigerian news-
papers "represent the scurrillous local press, pouring out their col-
10
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umns of venomous abuse, often bordering on sedition or libel."3 4
These attitudes were reflected in various types of controls
which were easily established because of the caveats contained in
the Nigerian Constitution.35 These caveats provided the loopholes
enabling the government to enact laws relating specifically to the
press. The controls ranged from regulations allowing direct censor-
ship, to sedition and other laws that colonial governors interpreted
broadly.
An intriguing question asks why, after independence, do many
African countries leave in their books those laws the colonial ad-
ministrators created to safeguard their own selfish and imperial
objectives? The answer is closely linked with the willingness of the
leaders of independent African countries to continue the legacies of
their colonial past. Many of the leaders began their careers as edi-
tors or publishers. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya was editor of
Muiguithania in the late 1920's, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania be-
gan his public career as editor of Sauti ye TANU. Nigeria's
Nnamdi Azikiwe started the West African Pilot for nationalist pur-
poses, while Kwame Nkrumah started a daily, the Accra Evening
News, for mobilizing political support.36 Many of these leaders, es-
pecially those who used the press to garner and ascend to political
power, fear the media. This is so because they are all too familiar
with the potential of the media for displacing ruling elites. Those
rulers who were also leaders of the nationalist movements regard
themselves as founders of the states, and would do anything to re-
main in power, even to the point of prostituting constitutionalism.
Any opposition or divergent opinions are regarded as attempts to
destroy the revolution for which the leaders endured so much to
build. One method of maintaining power was to force the press into
a groove of conformity, and leave those very laws they had at-
tacked in the statute books. Through this process, a new definition
of freedom of expression evolved.
The above discussion should answer the question of why there
are Nigerian laws designed to regulate specifically the establish-
ment of newspapers. The 1917 Newspapers Ordinance37 has a de-
posit requirement of 750 dollars, which presupposes the guilt of
34. R. JULY, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AFRICAN THOUGHT 360 (1968).
35. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
36. D. WILCOX, MASS MEDIA IN BLACK AFRICA PHILOSOPHY AND CONTROL 10 (1975).
A similar development occurred in the French controlled territories.
37. Newspapers Ordinance of 1917, ch. 129, 4 The Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
and Lagos (revised 1958).
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publishers in libel cases." T.O. Elias, the former Chief Justice of
the Nigerian Supreme Court, said:
The minister may pay out of it [the deposit] such penalty as may
from time to time be imposed by any court in Nigeria on the
proprietor, printer, or publisher, whether in respect of libel pub-
lished in the newspaper or otherwise. Whatever amount is thus
paid out . . . must be made good on the same day, so that the
deposit held by the Minister in respect of the particular newspa-
per stands at [250, $750]. . . . Failure to make good the deposit
will result in the newspaper being suspended until due repara-
tion is made.
39
In 1964, a Nigerian press law was enacted.' It seeks to make it
an offense to publish any confidential information about members
of parliament, high civil servants, and other high government func-
tionaries. Moreover, any journalist who makes comments injurious
to the good repute of these government officials is subject to pun-
ishment. The pertinent provisions of the law are as follows:
[W]here a person, to whom this section applies publishes or re-
produces or circulates in a newspaper any false statement or false
report which he knows or reasonably ought to know to be false
or where such person published or reproduces or circulates in a
newspaper such statement or report without due regard being
first had as to its truth or falsity, he shall be guilty of an offence
and liable upon conviction . . . to imprisonment for a term of
not less than 12 months or more than 3 years ...
A prosecution for an offence under this section shall not be
instituted except with the consent of the Attorney-General:
Provided that a person charged with such an offence may be ar-
rested, or a warrant for his arrest may be issued or executed, and
any such person may be remanded in custody or on bail notwith-
standing that the consent of the Attorney-General to the institu-
tion of a prosecution for the offence has not been obtained but
no further proceedings shall be taken until the consent has been
obtained.41
The above provisions are akin to the United States Supreme Court
ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan4" as far as criticism of
public officials in their official capacity is concerned, but the simi-
larity stops there. The Times case was considered upon the philoso-
38. Id. § 3.
39. T. ELIAS, NIGERIAN PRESS LAW 2 (1969).
40. Nigerian Amendment Act, Federal Republic of Nigeria Laws (1964).
41. Id. § 27a(l)(2).
42. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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phy "that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open, and that it may include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."43 On the other hand, the Nigerian Newspaper Act
presumes that the publisher had knowledge of the statement's fal-
sity unless he proves that, prior to publication, he took reasonable
measures to verify its accuracy. 4
It is submitted that this law imposes very serious limitations on
newspaper reporting in Nigeria. The perishable nature of news, as
well as the elusive nature of government news sources, must be kept
in mind. These factors, coupled with the fact that no newspaper in
Nigeria can afford to send reporters to every part of the country to
check the veracity of every report, make it unreasonable to expect
reporters to conduct a thorough investigation of all their news items
before publication. How can the press possibly secure governmen-
tal accountability to the people if government officials and their
policies are never subject to criticism? What is to stop government
officials from declaring that unfavorable statements are false, par-
ticularly when the press's access to sources is limited? These ques-
tions are yet to be answered because, as Chief Justice Elias has said,
"It is interesting to record that this particular piece of legislation
has not so far been the subject of prosecution, nor has the Federal
Military Government seen fit to repeal it up to now."
45
A few cases in the areas of defamation, national security, and
seditious publication will illuminate the views of the Nigerian
Supreme Court. This case study will also reflect the state of free-
dom of expression in Nigeria.
The publication of a defamatory matter, whether it be libel or
slander, is a criminal offense.46 It is unnecessary that the defama-
tory matter be calculated to provoke violence, as is the case in
England. The Nigerian Supreme Court has drawn a distinction be-
tween spoken words that can be construed as vulgar by those who
hear them, which are not necessarily actionable as a tort, and spo-
ken words later reduced to writing, which are not protected. In Ben-
son v. West African Pilot, Ltd.,4 7 Chief Justice Ikpeazu held that
certain words spoken against the plaintiff at a press conference
43. Id. at 270.
44. Nigerian Amendment Act, Federal Republic of Nigeria Laws § 4(l)(2) (1964).
45. ELIAS, supra note 39, at 135.
46. 2 NIGERIAN CRIMINAL CODE §§ 60, 373 & 375 (1958).
47. N.M.L.R. 3 (1966). The citation N.M.L.R. refers to the Nigerian Monthly Law Re-
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were mere vulgar abuse because there was a squabble between
them. When the words were published later in the defendant's
newspaper, however, the judge held the written version actionable48
and purported to follow Lord Mansfield's dictum in the old English
case of Thorley v. Kerry.49 That case held that abusive words pub-
lished later by the person who spoke them cannot claim any protec-
tion." The Chief Justice stated that "for mere general abuse
spoken, no action lies."'1 He further stated that "had those same
words been written down by the person who spoke them, then they
would not be mere vulgar abuse any longer."52 The evidence before
the court indicated that the words were not written by the person
who uttered them, but by a reporter who was present at the press
conference. Because this was the case in Benson, the written version
published by the reporter ought to have been protected as a vulgar
abuse.
The issues in the areas of national security and seditious pub-
lication seem to overlap. The government often uses methods, such
as the declaration of an emergency in the whole or parts of the
country, to punish those newspapers it does not like. The Seditions
Act53 forbids, among other things, publications that intend to in-
duce hatred or contempt for the Sovereign or the government, or
the laws or constitution of the Realm. The Act also forbids publica-
tions that intend to excite discontent and dissatisfaction among the
citizens of Nigeria, or to promote feelings of ill-will and public dis-
order.54 The problem is that the offense of sedition can arise from
criticizing matters of general public concern where very little re-
straint is exercised in the choice of words. Hence, even where no
revolt is intended by the author of such words, if narrowly con-
strued and without due consideration to the fact that in political
matters greater latitude should be accorded, the inference of a sedi-
tious intention is easy. For example, in Director of Public
Prosecution v. Obi 55 the following statement was construed as ex-
pressing a seditious intent:
48. Id at 9.
49. 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
50. Id. at 371.
51. Benson v. West African Pilot, Ltd., N.M.L.R. 3, 9 (1966).
52. Id
53. 2 NIGERIAN CRIMINAL CODE §§ 50-52(c), (d) (1958).
54. Id
55. ALL N.L.R. 184 (1961). The citation ALL N.L.R. refers to the All Nigeria Law
Reports.
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Down with the enemies of the people, the exploiters of the weak
and oppressors of the poor . . ! The days of those who have
enriched themselves at the expense of the poor are numbered.
The common man in Nigeria can today no longer be fooled by
sweet talk at election time only to be exploited and treated like
dirt after the booty of office has been shared among the politi-
cians.5 6
Obi's apparent intention in the above attack was to dissuade the
people from voting for the incumbents in the upcoming election.
For this he was convicted, and his appeal to the supreme court was
dismissed. The crucial point is that seditious convictions normally
punish the intention supposedly lurking behind a statement.
Clarence Darrow's statement that "there is no such crime as a crime
of thought; there are only crimes of action" seems to be pertinent in
these matters. Yet, surprisingly, "publications intended to promote
feelings of ill-will and hositility" or "to raise discontent and disaf-
fection" can be termed seditious, according to the Act. 57 In this re-
gard the United States Supreme Court's holding in Terminiello v.
Chicago58 points up the sharp contrast between the two countries.
The Court, through Justice Douglas, said:
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of gov-
ernment is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatis-
faction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling ef-
fects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
59
The above cases provide but a mere glimpse into the state of
freedom of expression in Nigeria. They also expose the loopholes
any authoritarian-inclined government can exploit in order to
render the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression mean-
ingless. Fortunately, Nigeria still has the opportunity to reformu-
late the provisions of section twenty-five of the constitution for the
purpose of enhancing the protection provided for freedom of ex-
pression.
56. Id. at 186.
57. 2 NIGERIAN CRIMINAL CODE §§ 50-52(c), (d) (1958).
58. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
59. Id. at 4.
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IV. CONCLUSION
When suggesting what can be done to enhance the guarantees
pertaining to freedom of expression, it is necessary to examine the
rationale of the Constitutional Drafting Committee's action of vir-
tually transplanting section twenty-five of the 1963 constitution,
with all of its inadequacies, directly to draft section thirty-five. The
Committee acknowledged that many members had pressed for the
inclusion of a special provision in the constitution enabling the
press to publish and circulate matters of public interest. Yet, the
Committee stated "that there are no grounds for giving any Niger-
ian citizen a lesser right to freedom of expression than any other
person or citizen who happens to be a newspaper editor or re-
porter."' 60 Thus, the Committee equated freedom of the press with
that of an individual.
This argument, equating the press with the individual, fails to
recognize the dynamic nature of the world in which we live. Be-
cause of this dynamism, the individual must grapple with and inter-
pret complex phenomena if he is ever to understand his immediate
environment. Therefore, there is need for an informed citizenry.
Most people rarely have the time, money, and knowledge necessary
to exercise their personal right of access to information; even if they
were able and committed enough to unearth relevant facts, they
may find them so complex, conflicting, and unintelligible that inter-
pretation would become imperative. It follows that, functionally,
the press is in a better position to vindicate the peoples' right to
know by monitoring the activities of legislators and administrators.
The press is equipped to collect, analyze, and disseminate this in-
formation to the public as a benefit to society generally. Govern-
ments in developing countries, in fact, utilize the press to promote
various developmental projects. This practice merely recognizes
that it is far more convenient to furnish information to the press
than to feed the same information in installments to many and
varied individuals. Moreover, the press may achieve a far wider
exposure than could possibly be achieved through an individual.
The Constitutional Drafting Committee, recognizing the po-
tentials of the press, spelled out what is regarded as obligations of
the mass media in the draft constitution. Section sixteen, chapter
60. Constitutional Drafting Committee, Report of the Constitutional Drafting Com-
mittee Containing the Draft Constitution 14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Drafting Committee
Report].
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two, of the draft deals with Fundamental Objectives and Directive
Principles of State Policy. The Committee states:
The [p]ress, [r]adio, [tlelevision and other agencies of the mass
media shall at all times be free to uphold the [flundamental
[o]bjectives. . . of this Constitution and uphold the responsibil-
ity and accountability of the government to the people.
6 1
Obviously, an institution that is responsible for bridging the
gap between the government and the people needs some specific
constitutional guarantees as a safeguard to its effectiveness. This
need was recognized by Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion in
Saxbe v. Washington Port Co.,62 when he stated:
The court did not hold that the government is wholly free to
restrict press access to newsworthy information. To the contrary,
we recognized explicitly that the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of the press does extend to some of the antecedent activities
that make the right to publish meaningful.
63
It will be interesting, however, to test the scope of the term "free-
dom" in the provision that states, "the mass media shall at all times
be free to uphold the [f]undamental [o]bjectives" of the draft
constitution in the courts. It is imperative that the new constitution
provide the judiciary with the power of judicial review over legisla-
tive and executive action. The power of the Nigerian judiciary to
carry out such duties was eroded by the abolition of the Judicial
Service Commission in 1963.65 The abolition allows the Prime Min-
ister or the Premier of a Region to advise the President or the Gov-
ernor on the appointment of judges, and the removal of judges
came to depend upon the vote of politicians in both houses of Par-
liament. This may not be sufficient evidence to conclude that the
Nigerian judiciary has lost its independence; nevertheless, it is
hardly reassuring to know that the judiciary is subordinated to the
executive. Unfortunately, the Commission was abolished just as it
was beginning to serve as an example to other countries. Comment-
ing on the power of appointing, promoting, and removing judges,
61. Id.
62. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
63. Id. at 859 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Drafting Committee Report, supra note 60 (emphasis added).
65. The commission was abolished in 1977 by the Federal Government of Nigeria.
Decree No. 66 (Oct. 24, 1977). The decree also provided for the establishment, in each state
of the federation, of an Interim Judicial Committee charged with the responsibility of ap-
pointing all grades of Magistrates except that of Magistrate Grade III, who would be ap-
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the International Commission of Jurists, in 1961, had recom-
mended
that these powers should not be put into the hands of the Execu-
tive, or the Legislative, but should be entrusted exclusively to an
independent organ, such as the Judicial Service Commission of
Nigeria so that in exceptional circumstances, removal of a judge
should be before a body of judicial character, assuring at least,
the same safeguards to the judge as would be accorded to an
accused person in a criminal trial.66
The foregoing discussion of freedom of expression, as guaran-
teed in the Nigerian Bill of Rights, has indicated a very uncertain
legal premise upon which to base such a critical and fundamental
right. The Constituent Assembly, which met late in 1977, had the
opportunity of ensuring not only a freedom of the press guarantee
free of provisos and exceptions, but also the opportunity to rein-
state the Judicial Service Commission for the purpose of reversing
the subordination of the judiciary to the executive. Unfortunately,
no action was taken to further either of these attractive proposals.
Hopefully, the Committee will persevere until they can provide the
courts with the assurances necessary to enable them to adopt the
dynamic role of providing guidelines for the enjoyment of all fun-
damental rights, including freedom of expression.
66. International Commission of Jurists, Report of the African Conference on the Rule
of Law 20-21 (Jan. 3-7, 1961). The conference was held in Lagos, Nigeria.
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